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IN RE GOVERNORSHIP: CURBING MIKE
CURB-CONSTITUTIONALLY
By David B. Lloyd*
Upon returning from a trip to the east coast in March 1979, Gov-
ernor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. was presented with a fair accompli by
Lieutenant Governor Mike Curb, in the form of a judicial appointment
to the California Court of Appeal. Political ruminations and rumblings
dominated the spring, blossoming into a legal brouhaha in the summer,
finally culminating with the California Supreme Court decision last
winter, In re Governorship.1
This intragovernmental branch dispute is unique in the state's his-
tory, due in part to the fact that, for the first time in almost one-hun-
dred years, the two leaders of the executive branch of the government
are from different political parties.2
The issues presented to the California Supreme Court in this case
were narrowly framed: (1) Does the lieutenant governor have the
power, under article V, section 10 of the California Constitution, to
make a judicial appointment when the governor is absent from the
state? (2) If such power does exist, can the governor validly withdraw
such an appointment upon his return to the state?3 But underlying
these two problems lurks the broader, and much more important issue
of just who governs the state when the governor is physically outside its
boundaries.
The supreme court, in a decision by Justice Wiley Manuel,4 ruled
that the lieutenant governor has authority to exercise gubernatorial
powers of appointment to the appellate court while the governor is
physically absent from the state and that the governor has the authority
* B.S., 1978, University of Santa Clara; member second year class.
1. 26 Cal. 3d 110, 603 P.2d 1357, 160 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1979). The opinion was a consoli-
dation of Brown v. Curb, in which the Governor petitioned for writs of mandate and prohi-
bition and for declaratory relief, and In re Governorship, filed by the State Commission on
the Governorship for determination of questions under article V, section 10 of the California
Constitution.
2. In the gubernatorial election of 1886, Washington Bartlett, a Democrat, won the
governorship, while Robert Waterman, a Republican, won the lieutenant governorship.
Bartlett died after eight months in office, and Waterman served out the remainder of his
term. 1 J. KALLENBACH & S. KALLENBACH, AMERICAN STATE GOVERNORS, 1776-1976 at
69 (1977).
3. 26 Cal. 3d at 113, 603 P.2d at 1359, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 762.
4. 1d.
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to withdraw the appointment at any time prior to the moment its con-
firmation becomes effective. 5
This note will assess the respective positions of the Governor and
the Lieutenant Governor in their law suit before the supreme court.
Though the legal and political ramifications of this controversy may, at
first blush, appear peculiar to California, the issues presented here tran-
scend state boundaries. Thus, this note will also briefly examine the
methods used by other states in dealing with the problem, along with
several recent proposals designed to streamline the executive
bureauracy. It will conclude, contrary to the judgment of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court that the Governor's absence from the state consti-
tutes a "disability" only when it is in fact disabling; that is, when the
governor is outside the state and unable to act in an emergency situa-
tion6 that calls for his immediate attention. Thus, unless a governor is
so "disabled," a mere physical absence from the state does not author-
ize the lieutenant governor to exercise full gubernatorial power.7
I. Statement of Facts
The seeds of dispute were sown in the gubernatorial election of
1978, when Edmund G. Brown, Jr. defeated his Republican challenger,
and Mike Curb defeated his Democratic opponent. The political hon-
eymoon between the two was short-lived and it was only a question of
time before a serious controversy would blossom."
On December 31, 1978, Presiding Justice Parker Wood retired
from the California Court of Appeal.9 Two weeks later, Brown initi-
ated the process of appointment to fill the vacancy by sending the
names of eleven candidates to the Chairperson of the Los Angeles
County Bar Association's Judicial Appointments Committee for evalu-
ation. The Committee's evaluation of the candidates was received by
the Governor on March 12, 1979. Ten days later, Brown submitted the
name of Bernard Jefferson, associate justice of the court of appeal, to
the Board of Governors of the State Bar for consideration, along with
the name of a replacement to fill Jefferson's old post. 10
5. Id.
6. An "emergency situation" could be defined as a sudden, generally unexpected oc-
currence or set of circumstances.
7. This power includes all responsibility, constitutional and statutory, imposed on the
governor. See generally CAL. CONST. art. V.
8. Brown's presidential ambitions were widely known at the time, and there was no
question that he would frequently be absent from the state in the future. Curb, buoyed by
his successful first attempt at public office, was also seen as having high ambitions, and it
was doubtful that he would remain idle if given the opportunity to exercise gubernatorial
power during the Governor's absence.
9. Second Appellate District, Division One.
10. Both these submissions were made in accordance with an arrangement, traditional
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Brown left Los Angeles International Airport at 10:00 a.m. on
March 26, 1979, bound for Washington, D.C., to testify on behalf of the
State of California before the Energy and Natural Resources Commit-
tee of the United States Senate, at the invitation of Senator Henry Jack-
son. Brown was absent from the state for approximately forty hours,
returning to Los Angeles on March 28 at 2:11 a.m. During Brown's
absence, on March 27 at about 3:00 p.m., Sheldon Lytton, chief assis-
tant to Lieutenant Governor Curb, called Gray Davis, Brown's execu-
tive secretary, informing him of Curb's intention to appoint Judge
Armand Arabian of the Los Angeles Superior Court to the vacancy on
the court of appeal. Davis informed Lytton that Brown intended to
appoint Jefferson to that vacancy, that Arabian's name had not been
submitted to the State Bar for evaluation and thus was in violation of
the traditional arrangement between the State Bar and the Governor,
and that Arabian's appointment would be contrary to the Governor's
expressed intentions. Davis also warned Lytton that, should Curb ap-
point Arabian, Brown would withdraw the appointment upon re-
turning to the state. Shortly afterwards, Lytton, in a second phone call
to Davis, informed him that notwithstanding Brown's opposition, Curb
would proceed with the Arabian appointment. " Later that same day,
by letter to the Commission on Judicial Appointments,' 2 Curb ap-
pointed'3 Arabian to the vacancy on the California Court of Appeal.
Upon returning to the state on March 28, Brown telegrammed the
Commission and withdrew Curb's appointment of Arabian. Two days
later, the Governor appointed Jefferson to the post.'
4
In response, Curb sent a letter to the Commission on April 2, as-
in California since the administration of Governor Earl Warren, whereby the governor sub-
mits to the Board of Governors of the State Bar the names of prospective appointees to the
court of appeal for evaluation prior to their submission to the Commission on Judicial Ap-
pointments for confirmation.
11. Such interexecutive disagreements apparently were common. In September 1979,
for example, while Brown was campaigning in Texas, Curb phoned Brown and his staff
several times demanding to know Brown's intention on pending tax relief bills. If they were
not signed, Curb warned, he would storm the Governor's office and act on the bills himself.
The Governor's executive secretary responded that there was no way Curb would have been
given the bills to sign. San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 29, 1979, at 34, col. 6.
12. An appointment by the governor to fill a vacancy in the court of appeal "is effective
when confirmed by the Commission on Judicial Appointments." CAL. CONST. art. VI,
§ 16(d). The Commission consists of the Chief Justice, the Attorney General and, when the
appointment to be considered is to a court of appeal vacancy, the senior presiding justice of
the affected court. Id., art. VI, § 7.
13. The "appointment" in this case was actually a nomination. The appointee would
not be vested with the right to office until confirmed by the Commission and given his com-
mission by the Governor.
14. Although the Board of Governors of the State Bar had not yet completed its evalua-
tion of Jeffersop, it advised Brown that, in light of Curb's actions, it did not object to Brown
proceeding with the Jefferson appointment.
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serting his belief that his earlier appointment of Arabian was a valid
one, not subject to rescission by Governor Brown without the ap-
pointee's consent.15 Two weeks later, Chief Justice Rose Bird, acting in
her capacity as chairperson of the Commission, requested assistance
from Brown and Curb with respect to their conflicting appointments.
Then, on April 30, the chief justice sent a letter to State Senator James
Mills, Chairman of the Commission on the Governorship,' 6 inquiring
whether the Commission intended to consider the conflicting conten-
tions of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor. Mills responded af-
firmatively, and on May 8 the Commission on the Governorship held
its inaugural meeting. One week later, the Commission voted to peti-
tion the California Supreme Court for a definitive interpretation of ar-
ticle V, section 10 of the California Constitution which defines the
powers of the lieutenant governor during the governor's absence from
the state. 7 On September 6, counsel for both parties and counsel for
the Commission presented arguments before the court. Brown's legal
advisor claimed that Curb's constitutional interpretation of section 10
would create chaos, while Curb's lawyer argued that his client's posi-
tion was sanctified in both California law and tradition.' 8 Thus, the
lines were clearly drawn, the issues were cogently framed, and a minor
political dispute had blossomed into a full legal controversy that was to
last the remainder of the year.' 9
II. The Court's Opinion
Justice Manuel, speaking for six members of the court, divided the
majority opinion into three segments. The first part disposed of the
jurisdictional question raised by both the Commission on the Gover-
norship and Brown. The second part, the interpretation of the constitu-
tion's phrase "absence from the State"20 occupied the bulk of the
opinion. The Governor's authority to revoke, rescind, or withdraw an
15. "This belief is based on the fact that once the appointment has been made, the
constitutional scheme vests in the Commission, and in the Commission alone, the power to
confirm or reject the appointment. Therefore, because Judge Arabian does not consent to
the withdrawal of his appointment, said appointment cannot and has not been withdrawn."
Letter from Mike Curb to the Commission on Judicial Appointments (April 2, 1979).
16. The Commission is the statutory body created as a result of the constitutional revi-
sion of 1966. See notes 22-23 and accompanying text infra.
17. See note 22 infra.
18. San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 7, 1979, at 8, col. 1.
19. Brown left the state capital shortly before the presentation of arguments to cam-
paign nationwide, returning briefly in early January to deliver his annual state-of-the-State
address to the legislature. Traditionally, such a long absence required legislative approval;
however, a little-known bill passed legislative muster the previous spring, allowing the Gov-
ernor to be absent for up to one year without legislative approval. The bill became law
without the Governor's signature-he was not in Sacramento at the time.
20. CAL. CONST. art V, § 10.
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appointment of the Lieutenant Governor was the final issue to be re-
solved. The court concluded by issuing a peremptory writ of mandate
to the Commission on Judicial Appointments to exercise its discretion
with respect to the appointment of Justice Jefferson to the post of Pre-
siding Justice of the California Court of Appeal.2 '
A. Jurisdiction
In 1966, the California Constitution was revised to state that, inter
alia, "[t]he Lieutenant Governor shall act as Governor during the im-
peachment, absence from the State, or other temporary disability of the
Governor. ' 22 Standing to raise issues of vacancy or temporary disabil-
ity was vested in the Commission on the Governorship, a body created23
by the legislature pursuant to the constitutional revision. Exclusive
jurisdiction to determine all questions relating to vacancies in the office
of the governor, or to any temporary disabilities of the governor, rested
with the supreme court.24
According to a literal reading of the language in article V, section
10, the Commission had standing to raise questions of vacancy or tem-
porary disability, but not questions associated with the Governor's ab-
sence from the state. Therefore, it felt obliged to make a jurisdictional
argument. In its brief before the court, the Commission argued that it
had standing to sue because the word "other" in "other temporary dis-
abilit[ies] of the Governor, ' 25 should be read consistent with the partic-
ular class of words it follows, and include other types of disabilities.
26
Thus, the Governor's absence from the state was alleged by the Com-
mission to be a kind of temporary disability within the meaning of arti-
cle V, section 10, and therefore the Commission should have standing
21. 26 Cal. 3d at 122, 603 P.2d at 1366, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
22. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 10 provides in full: "The Lieutenant Governor shall become
Governor when a vacancy occurs in the office of Governor. [ 1] The Lieutenant Governor
shall act as Governor during the impeachment, absence from the State, or other temporary
disability of the Governor or of a Governor-elect who fails to take office. [ 1] The Legislature
shall provide an order of precedence after the Lieutenant Governor for succession to the
office of Governor and for the temporary exercise of the Governor's functions. [ ] The
Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions arising under this sec-
tion. [ 1] Standing to raise questions of vacancy or temporary disability is vested exclusively
in a body provided by statute."
23. The Commission consists of "the President pro Tempore of the Senate, the Speaker
of the State Assembly, the President of the University of California, the Chancellor of the
California State Colleges, and the State Director of Finance." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12070
(West Supp. 1980).
24. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 10.
25. Id.
26: See Thompson v. Hance, 174 Cal. 572, 579, 163 P. 1021, 1024 (1917) ("Other" must
be construed in connection with the other parts of the subdivision to which it relates. To
wrench it from its context would be to ignore the rule of eusdem generis).
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to petition the court to raise questions concerning his absence from the
state.27
The Commission further argued that, even if the Governor's ab-
sence was not a temporary disability, it was another kind of question,
the existence of which gave standing to the Commission to petition the
supreme court to determine all questions relative to the authority of the
Lieutenant Governor to act as Governor during the Governor's ab-
sence from the state.28 The court found it unnecessary to reach this
second argument, concluding that the first would suffice since it was
"obvious that absence from the state is a temporary disability within
the meaning of article V, section 10."29 Having found that the Com-
mission had standing, the court was willing to consider pleadings and
arguments from all interested persons on matters within the scope of
the Commission's questions.30  Because of the exclusive jurisdiction
given to it in this case, the court also was willing to grant relief, declara-
tory or otherwise, that ordinarily would be appropriate only from trial
courts. 3 '
B. Interpretation of "Absence From the State"
The Governor contended that under article V, section 10, his de-
27. Curb acknowledged that the Governor's absence from the state was a "temporary
disability" under article V, section 10, but argued that "absence from the state" did not need
to be defined or explained because its meaning was clear.
28. The Commission argued that, even though they may lack express standing in this
case, their standing to petition the court should be implied in the words of article V, section
10. See Reuter v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Cal. 314, 321, 30 P.2d 417, 420 (1934) (Provi-
sions of a constitution or of a statute should receive practical, rather than technical construc-
tion; one leading to a wise policy, rather than mischief or absurdity.); Johnston v. Baker, 167
Cal. 260, 264, 139 P. 86, 88-89 (1914) (Whatever is necessarily implied in a statute is as much
a part of it as that which is expressed. A statute must be construed with reference to the
object to be accomplished by it).
29. 26 Cal. 3d at 115, 603 P.2d at 1361, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 764 (footnote omitted).
30. Brown's petitions for writs of mandate and prohibition and for declaratory relief
asserted that (1) Brown and Jefferson had standing to raise questions because they were
beneficially interested in the enforcement of constitutionally prescribed processes; (2) Curb
lacked the authority to determine the existence of a temporary disability of the Governor,
and, no such determination having been made by the supreme court, he lacked authority to
assume the powers of the Governor by purporting to make a gubernatorial appointment; (3)
Brown, on the facts tendered, was not effectively absent from the state, within the meaning
of article V, section 10; and (4) Brown may validly withdraw the appointment of Arabian at
any time prior to its confirmation by the Commission on Judicial Appointments. Curb ar-
gued that (1) Brown was absent from the state on the day in question. giving Curb plenary
authority under the constitution to make the appointment; and (2) Brown's conclusions were
simply argumentative conclusions of law, and were in error. Id. at 114, 603 P.2d at 1361,
160 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
31. "The Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, and their judges have origi-
nal jurisdiction in. . .proceedings for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus, cer-
tiorari, and prohibition." CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 10.
[Vol. 7:831
Spring 1980] CURBING MIKE CURB 837
parture from the state would confer no gubernatorial power on the
Lieutenant Governor without a prior petition to the California
Supreme Court by the Commission on the Governorship, followed by
the court's determination that the absence would constitute a tempo-
rary disability. According to Brown the court's exclusive jurisdiction in
such cases made it the only entity that could conclude authoritatively
that the Governor was temporarily disabled by an absence. The court
rejected this argument, reasoning that:
To require express judicial authorization before the Lieutenant
Governor could act as Governor during the Governor's absence
or other temporary disability would contravene the purpose of
article V, section 10 . . . . The Lieutenant Governor-like any
public officer with executive duties-must apply and, if neces-
sary, interpret the law prescribing those duties as found in the
Constitution, legislation, and authoritative decisions. Our role is
to resolve controversies as to interpretation, not to dictate initial
formulations.32
With this resolved the court moved on to the main point of dis-
pute. Brown and Curb offered two possible interpretations of the
phrase "absence from the state." Brown proposed that the term "ab-
sence" must be read as "effective absence,"33 requiring not only a phys-
ical absence, but also an inability to perform a particular act, brought
on by a physical disability. 4 Brown further alleged that the challenged
action here was not warranted by an emergency situation or any other
necessity,35 and consequently, the actions of the Lieutenant Governor
should be subject to a high degree of scrutiny36 because they were con-
32. 26 Cal. 3d at 117, 603 P.2d at 1362, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 764-65.
33. The first case to use this term was Olson v. Lahiff, 146 Wis. 490, 492, 131 N.W. 824,
825 (1911) (" 'Absence'. . construed reasonably. . . means. .. 'effective' absence."). See
also Markham v. Cornell, 136 Kan. 884, 896, 18 P.2d 158, 164 (1933) (For the Lieutenant
Governor to act "[tihere must be a situation where the peace and dignity of the state is in
danger, or the orderly functioning of government is threatened."); Warmoth v. Graham, 26
La. Ann. 568, 570 (1874) (It was "[never] contemplated that the movements of the Governor
should be watched, with the view that the Lieutenant Governor. . . should slip into his seat,
the moment he stepped across the borders of the State."); Crittenden v. Walker, 78 Mo. 139,
141 (1883) ("[A]bsence must be of such a character as to indicate on the part of the governor,
an abdication for the time being of the duties of the office. ... ). Similar constructions can
be found in In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 112 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1959); Tennant v.
Parker, 3 Neb. 409 (1872); In re An Act Concerning Alcoholic Beverages, 130 N.J.L. 123, 31
A.2d 837 (1943). For cases dealing with absences of mayors or other local officials, see
Watkins v. Mooney, 114 Ky. 646, 71 S.W. 622 (1903); Cytacki v. Buscko, 226 Mich. 524, 197
N.W. 1021 (1924); Mayor of Detroit v. Moran, 46 Mich. 213, 9 N.W. 252 (1881); Gelinas v.
Fugere, 55 R.I. 225, 180 A. 346 (1935).
34. See generall
, 
Sawyer v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 82 Nev. 53, 410 P.2d 748 (1966).
See also note 140 and accompanying text infra.
35. See generally Markham v. Cornell, supra note 33 and accompanying text.
36. "[Iln [the] event of a specified official's physical non-presence, the crux of a provi-
sion for succession in the event of 'absence' is the state's immediate need for a specific act or
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trary to the Governor's previously expressed intent.37 Curb, on the
other hand, relied on a literal interpretation of the phrase "absence
from the state," arguing that Brown was absent on the day in question,
giving Curb plenary authority under the constitution to make the ap-
pointment.38 With the issue so framed, the court concluded that "con-
stitutional and legislative history, contemporaneous interpretation and
historical practice, and considerations of public policy, namely the
need for certainty in effectuating executive decisions, support the Lieu-
tenant Governor's position. 39
L Constitutional and Legislative History
The phrase "absence from the state" has remained unchanged in
the California Constitution for 130 years.40 The present article V, sec-
tion 10, on which this dispute turned, was adopted in 1966, as proposed
by the Constitutional Revision Commission. The court relied upon the
legislative history of that proposed amendment for its literal reading of
"absence from the state" and for its interpretation of "temporary disa-
bility."' 4 1 Special counsel to the Constitutional Revision Commission
had indicated, in testimony before the legislature, that:
[T]he Commission felt that if the constitution should prohibit the
Governor from acting then it should be classified as a disability.
It is not an inability. The Governor could be someplace outside the
state and be very capable ofperforming his duties by a long distance
function. Certainly, where the act or function performed by the successor is obviously con-
trary to policies of the absentee official, a closer scrutiny is warranted to determine if the
'absence' was 'effective.'" Sawyer v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 82 Nev. at 57-58, 410 P.2d at
750. See also Lurvey, Absent Officials: No Carte Blanchefor Successors, 15 J. PUB. L. 324
(1966).
37. See text accompanying notes 9-14 supra.
38. "Every law of this State relating to the powers and duties of the Governor...
extends to the person performing for the time being the duties of Governor." CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 12002 (West Supp. 1980). Case law supporting Curb's position is far less prevalent
than that supporting Brown's "effective absence" interpretation. See note 33 supra. But see
Exparte Crump, 10 Okla. Crim. 133, 135 P. 428, 436 (1913) ("[In the Governor's] absence
from the state ... [the] constitutional functions [of his office] shall devolve upon the Lieu-
tenant Governor. ... ). See also Walls v. Hall, 202 Ark. 999, 154 S.W.2d 573 (1941);
Montgomery v. Cleveland, 134 Miss. 132, 98 So. 111 (1923).
39. 26 Cal. 3d at 117, 603 P.2d at 1362, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
40. "In case of the impeachment of the Governor, or his removal from office, death,
inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, resignation, or absence from
the state, the powers and duties of the office shall devolve upon the Lieutenant-Governor for
the residue of the term, or until the disability shall cease." CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. V, § 17.
Substantially the same phrase was used in the Constitution of 1879 (art. V, § 16), and in the
amendments of 1898, 1946 and 1948. See generally C. GOODWIN, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
STATE GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA, 1846-1850 (1914); Hunt, The Genesis of Calfornia's
First Constitution (1846-49), in VIII JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (H. Adams, ed. 1895).
41. 26 Cal. 3d at 118, 603 P.2d at 1362, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
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telephone. [But in the Commission's view] lhe would be legally dis-
abledfrom doing so. 42
The legislature adopted the Commission's interpretation of "absence,"
concluding that a physically absent governor cannot act, and is there-
fore legally disabled.
2 Historical Practice and Contemporaneous Interpretation
The court noted that neither party had brought to its attention any
previous court's rejection of the proposition that the governor's physi-
cal absence confers full gubernatorial power on the lieutenant gover-
nor.43 Consequently, the court did not feel inclined to reject it now.
"The state government has functioned under this provision without any
question that its language means what it plainly states."44 Research
revealed that during the past sixteen years over 1,400 gubernatorial ac-
tions had been taken by an acting governor (lieutenant governor or
president pro tempore of the Senate) while the governor was physically
absent from the state.4 Thus, with marked deference to the wording of
the constitution, the court rejected the argument that "absence" should
be interpreted to reflect modem conditions of travel and communica-
tion:
We note that the Constitution Revision Commission could have
proposed a change in the language in 1966 to reflect modem con-
ditions of travel and communication but did not do so. We are
not persuaded that time or technology compels such a change by
judicial fiat.4 6
The court noted that other jurisdictions that had been faced with
this issue had followed the Governor's view, that not merely a physical
absence, but an "effective" absence had to be shown before the acting
42. Transcript, Assembly Interim Comm. on Const. Amends. 29-34 (Feb. 23, 1966),
cited in In re Governorship, 26 Cal. 3d at 118, 603 P.2d at 1362, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 765
(emphasis added). "We put these two examples [impeachment and absence from the state]
in ... because we wanted to be sure that these were construed to be [a] temporary disabil-
ity, because if we just said temporary disability we think it would be reasonable for someone
to construe impeachment as not being [a] temporary disability." Transcript, Assembly In-
terim Comm. on Const. Amends. 33 (Feb. 23, 1966), citedin In re Governorship, 26 Cal. 3d
at 118, 603 P.2d at 1363, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
43. 26 Cal. 3d at 118, 603 P.2d at 1363, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 763.
44. Id. (footnote omitted).
45. Id. at n.6. Statistics were compiled by the Lieutenant Governor's administrative
assistant. The total number of proclamations, executive orders, pardons and legislative en-
actments signed by acting governors from 1963 to 1979 breaks down as follows: 1963 to
1967 (during Edmund G. ("Pat") Brown's second term) 321; 1967 to 1975 (during Ronald
Reagan's terms) 1026; 1975 to 1979 (during Edmund G. ("Jerry") Brown's first term) 61.
The proclamations and executive orders included, inter alia, states of emergency, holidays,
Alex Haley Day and Flash Flood Awareness Week. Declaration of Leonard Breijo, Objec-
tion and Response to Petitioners' Exhibit 7 at 6-13, Brown v. Curb, S.F. No. 24021.
46. 26 Cal. 3d at 118-19, 603 P.2d at 1363, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 765-66.
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governor could exercise gubernatorial power.47 Nevertheless, the court
found these cases neither persuasive nor controlling:48
The conceptual difficulty with the effective-absence test is that
virtually any physical absence of the Governor may create a need
for action by an acting governor, at least to deal with emergen-
cies. . . .There is no room . . . for a watered down "effective"
absence or any other concept whereby an acting governor could
discharge some but not all of the duties of the governor in his
absence.49
The Governor here claimed no power to act from outside the state's
boundaries. Therefore, as the court concluded, since a physically ab-
sent governor cannot act, the overriding purpose of avoiding a hiatus in
the availability of executive power required that, during his absence,
the sole and entire power to act as governor5 ° be transferred to a physi-
cally present lieutenant governor.5 1 Furthermore, the court believed
that a lieutenant governor, as acting governor, is free to act on
whatever matters he determines need attention during the governor's
absence." Thus, the court concluded, "the appointment by Lieutenant
Governor Curb of Judge Arabian as presiding justice of the Court of
Appeal was valid. 53
47. See cases cited in notes 33-36 and accompanying text supra.
48. 26 Cal. 3d at 119 n.7, 603 P.2d at 1363 n.7, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 766 n.7.
49. Id. at 119-20, 603 P.2d at 1363-64, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
50. This broad grant of power seems to contradict the narrow holding of the court, ie.,
that a Lieutenant Governor has the power to make a judicial appointment to an appellate
court during the Governor's absence. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
51. 26 Cal. 3d at 119, 603 P.2d at 1363, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 766. See also the following
legislative enactments which implement article V, section 10: CAL. GOVT CODE § 12002
("Every law of this State relating to the powers and duties of the Governor and to acts and
duties to be performed by others toward him extends to the person performing for the time
being the duties of Governor."); id. § 12058 ("In case of impeachment of the Governor or
officer acting as Governor, his absence from the state, or his other temporary disability to
discharge the powers and duties of office, then the powers and duties of the office of Gover-
nor devolve upon the same officer as in the case of vacancy in the office of Governor, but
only until the disability shall cease."). Case law is also in accord with this conclusion. See
Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 244 (1944) ("Not lightly vacated is the verdict
of quiescent years.") (quoting Coler v. Corn Exchange Bank, 250 N.Y. 136, 141, 164 N.E.
882, 884 (1928); South Dakota v. Brown, 20 Cal. 3d 765, 779, 576 P.2d 473, 481-82, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 758, 767 (1978) ("The general acceptance of the practice of a succession of California
Governors . . . 'is entitled to great weight.' ").
52. The perceptive reader might question whether Curb's appointment of Arabian, after
a three-month vacancy, was a matter requiring immediate attention during Brown's forty
hour absence. See notes 9-14 and accompanying text supra.
53. 26 Cal. 3d at 120, 603 P.2d at 1364, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
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C. The Governor's Authority to Revoke, Withdraw or Rescind the
Lieutenant Governor's Appointment
Curb contended that, once the Arabian appointment 54 was made,
the power and authority over the appointment transferred to the con-
firming power (the Commission on Judicial Appointments),55 and the
appointment could not then be revoked.56 Therefore, Curb argued that
although Brown had a remedy at law with which to challenge the ap-
pointment, it could be asserted only after the appointment was con-
firmed by the Commission.
Brown responded that he could validly withdraw the appointment
of Arabian at any time prior to the confirmation of the appointee by the
Commission on Judicial Appointments. The court agreed. In doing so,
it relied upon the principle established in Marbury v. Madison,7 as set
forth by Chief Justice John Marshall:
Some point of time must be taken when the power of the execu-
tive over an officer, not removable at his will, must cease. That
point of time must be when the constitutional power of appoint-
ment has been exercised. And this power has been exercised
when the last act, required from the person possessing the power,
has been performed."8
California courts have consistently followed this principle. In
Wetherbee v. Cazneau,59 Cazneau's appointment to office by the Gov-
ernor was later withdrawn, before the Senate could confirm it. The
Governor then appointed Wetherbee, issuing a commission of office to
him. In an attack on the validity of the commission, the court upheld
Wetherbee's appointment, concluding that an appointment to fill an
office was complete upon the delivery of the commission. Thus, after
the commission was issued the Governor could not revoke the appoint-
ment.60 Similarly, in Conger v. Gilmer,6 Conger was elected by the
Board of Supervisors to fill a vacancy on the Board. The following
day, the Board reconsidered what it had done and appointed a certain
Gilmer instead. The court dismissed Conger's challenge stating that
54. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
55. See note 12 supra.
56. See MacAlister v. Baker, 139 Cal. App. 183, 33 P.2d 469 (1934) (An appointment to
office is complete and beyond change by the appointing power when everything requiring
the action of the appointing power has been done.).
57. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
58. Id. at 157. "The last act to be done by the president, is the signature of the commis-
sion. He has then acted on the advice and consent of the senate to his own nomination. The
time for deliberation has then passed. He has decided. His judgment, on the advice and
consent of the senate concurring with his nomination, has been made, and the officer is
appointed." Id.
59. 20 Cal. 503 (1862).
60. .d. at 507.
61. 32 Cal. 75 (1867).
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"[u]ntil the commission. ..has been made out. . . and signed by the
• . .Board [of Supervisors], the whole matter is still within their con-
trol and they are. . . at liberty to change their minds .... 62 Several
other cases reiterate the principle that an appointment is deemed in-
complete until the issuance of the commission to office by the gover-
nor.63 Accordingly, in the present case, the California Supreme Court
had no difficulty finding that an appointment becomes "effective when
confirmed by the Commission on Judicial Appointments."'  Thus, the
appointment by the Governor did not by itself entitle the appointee to
take office; it was only the first step in a two-step process.
6 5
The court listed several reasons for allowing the Governor to with-
draw an incomplete appointment. 6 First, previous practices indicated
that other governors had withdrawn appointments from commission
consideration without challenge to their power. Second, because the
appointee had not yet acquired any legal rights, he could not object
that withdrawal constituted removal from office. Third, the power to
withdraw prolonged gubernatorial scrutiny of the appointment, better
assuring a candidate's qualifications.67 Finally, other states followed
the general rule that "where the nomination must be confirmed before
the officer can take the office or exercise any of its functions, the power
of removal is not involved and nominations may be changed at the will
of the executive until title to the office is vested. ' 68 For these reasons,
the court concluded that Brown's withdrawal of the Arabian appoint-
ment was valid.69
62. Id. at 79-80.
63. See Todd v. Essling, 268 Minn. 151, 156, 128 N.W.2d 307, 312 (1964) ("[I]n cases
where the appointment process is initiated by a nomination, with no power vesting in the
appointee. . . until confirmation, the rule laid down in the Marbury case has no application
until the senate confirms and the appointing authority issues a commission .. "); Burke v.
Schmidt, 86 S.D. 71, 77, 191 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1971) (The proper test should be "whether
the action of the executive is final and complete and places the appointee in office without
further action."). See generally 63 AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers & Employees § 104 (1972).
64. CAL. CONST. art. VI § 16(d).
65. The court did not decide at what point the appointment of a judge who is not sub-
ject to confirmation by the Commission on Judicial Appointments becomes irrevocable. 26
Cal. 3d at 122, n.9, 603 P.2d at 1365 n.9, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 768 n.9.
66. Id. at 122, 603 P.2d at 1365, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
67. See Nelson, Variations on a Theme--Selection and Tenure of Judges, 36 S. CAL. L.
REv. 4, 19-26 (1962).
68. McBride v. Osborn, 59 Ariz. 521, 327, 127 P.2d 134, 136 (1942) (emphasis omitted).
See also cases cited in note 63 supra. Query as to why the court was willing to accept the
views of other jurisdictions here, when they were unwilling to do so in interpreting "absence
from the state"? See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
69. 26 Cal. 3d at 122, 603 P.2d at 1366, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
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III. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Frank Newman was the only member of the court to write
a separate opinion.70 He agreed with the majority in holding that the
withdrawal of the Arabian appointment was valid and that the peremp-
tory writ of mandate to the Commission on Judicial Appointments
should be issued, but he challenged the conclusion that "a physically
absent Governor cannot act.' Justice Newman asserted that "phrases
in a constitution [that] were deemed apt for a horse-and-wagon era [do]
not ordain that we eschew sensible, up-to-date analysis of their mean-
ing 130 years later."72
A. Constitutional Interpretation
Though the majority focused primarily on the interpretation of the
phrase "absence from the state," Justice Newman centered his argu-
ment on the phrase "other temporary disability. ' 73 By examining two
constitutional provisions,74 he reached the conclusion that an absence
that is not physically disabling, ie., one that does not prevent the gov-
ernor from performing his duties, is not a "temporary disability." He
reasoned that (1) the office of governor must be filled "should the Gov-
ernor be killed, missing, or disabled, until [he] . ..is able to perform
[his] duties ...or a successor is elected, ' 75 and (2) the "Lieutenant
Governor shall act as Governor during the impeachment, absence from
the State, or other temporary disability of the Governor .... ,,76 There-
fore, Justice Newman concluded that an "other temporary disability"
(such as absence from the state) does not disable a governor in the same
70. Id. at 123, 603 P.2d at 1366, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
71. Id.
72. Id. See also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442 (1934) ("It is
no answer to. . .insist that what the provision of the Constitution meant to the vision of
that day it must mean to the vision of our time."); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34
(1920) ("[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitu-
tion of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the develop-
ment of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its
begetters. .. .The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience
and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago."); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819) ("[Wle must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding. . . .a constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to
be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."). See generally Miller, The Elusive Search
for Values in Constitutional Interpretation, 6 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 487 (1979).
73. 26 Cal. 3d at 124, 603 P.2d at 1366, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 769. By focusing on this
provision of article V, section 10, Justice Newman suggested not only that the court's analy-
sis was misguided, but that Brown's arguments were misguided as well. See notes 32-39 and
accompanying text supra.
74. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 21(b) and art. V § 10.
75. Id. at art. IV § 21(b) (emphasis added).
76. Id. at art. V § 10 (emphasis added).
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sense as if he were dead or missing. Rather, absence constitutes a true
disability only when it is in fact disabling; that is, when the governor is
physically prevented from performing his gubernatorial duties.77
It was clear to Justice Newman that an absent Governor is not in
fact disabled if he can perform the duties of his office despite his ab-
sence. Modern communication and technology permit a governor to
perform his duties from nearly any location, within or without Califor-
nia. 78
Justice Newman did not infer that in the twentieth century ab-
sence is never disabling. In times of a war- or enemy-caused disaster,79
serious illness of the governor, lack of communication from the gover-
nor, or a natural disaster, the state's needs would have to be met by the
lieutenant governor exercising gubernatorial powers in place of the
governor.80 In Justice Newman's view, however, there were many gu-
bernatorial tasks that could be performed anywhere, unaffected by
state boundaries. In these situations, the governor's absence should not
prevent him from exercising his power merely because he is outside the
state.
Accordingly, Justice Newman believed that the 130-year old inter-
pretation of "absence from the state" should not be rigidly adhered to
until modernized by constitutional amendment. "By no means does
rationality call for a Gold Rush Days approach to governing ...
[W]hen we contemplate its antiquated, stifling, and potentially hurtful
impact on use of the executive power in our complex State, cannot the
majority's approach here fairly be labeled radical (albeit reaction-
ary)?" ' I Though the purpose of article V, section 10 is "to prevent gaps
in the availability and continuity of the executive power," 82 discontinu-
ity and uncertainty will result from a determination that a physically
77. Following this analysis to its logical end, one might conclude that if the absence
from the state is not in fact disabling, then the Lieutenant Governor or his successor should
not act as Governor because the Governor's office remains filled by the Governor, though he
is physically absent.
78. "Constant travelers such as the President of the United States, the Governors of
other States with problems comparable to ours. . . every day benefit from telecopiers, dis-
tance-ignoring word-processors, 'talking' typewriters, signature reproducers, instant infor-
mation-retrieval, other marvels not affected by State or even international boundaries." 26
Cal. 3d at 124, 603 P.2d at 1367, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
79. CAL. CONsT. art. IV § 21.
80. 26 Cal. 3d at 125, 603 P.2d at 1367, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 117, 603 P.2d at 1362, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 764. Cf In re Advisory Opinion to the
Governor, 112 So. 2d 843, 847-48 (Fla. 1959) ("[I]nability . . . does not include within its
meaning the word 'absence' . . . [but] the nature of the conditions attendant upon such
absence could possibly constitute inability such as would justify a devolution of the powers
and duties of the office [of governor].").
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absent governor cannot act. 8
3
B. The Legislative Intent in 1966
Justice Newman believed that the legislative history used by the
majority in its interpretation of "absence from the state"8 4 was an unre-
liable indication of the true legislative intent in 1966. The individuals
involved in drafting article V, section 10 did not, in his opinion, intend
"to cast in concrete all the old assumptions on what those four words
['absence from the state'] demand." 85 Though the testimony of the staff
counsel to the Constitutional Revision Commission seems to support
the majority's view,86 Justice Newman explained that that testimony, as
quoted by the majority, would be best understood by examining it in
the context of the entire transcript.87 From this, it was evident, to him
at least, that a certain amount of ad-libbing by staff counsel was neces-
sary in answering some questions, and therefore, some answers were
only partially correct. As such, Justice Newman concluded that be-
cause the "draft language that puzzles us here was a tiny segment of a
huge set of initial recommendations, ' 88 the transcripts were too mis-
leading to form a reliable interpretation of legislative intent.
Justice Newman supported his arguments by attempting to distin-
guish the meanings of "inability" and "disability." 89 It would be profit-
able, he suggested, to examine the words used in the different
constitutions of the past 130 years. In 1849 "disability" meant im-
peachment, absence from the state and "inability to discharge the pow-
ers and duties of the office." 90 In the event of such a disability of the
governor, all "powers and duties of the office shall devolve upon the
Lieutenant-Governor." 9' There was no change in this section when the
83. See note 11 supra. Though the situation there involved a relatively minor dispute, it
is not difficult to imagine some of the problems that would occur in a more complicated
situation.
84. See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
85. 26 Cal. 3d at 126, 603 P.2d at 1368, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
86. In response to a question on the meaning of "absence from the state" and the consti-
tutional reference to "disability," counsel stated: "[t]he Commission felt that if the Constitu-
tion should prohibit the Governor from acting then it should be classified as a disability. It
is not an inability. The Governor could be someplace outside the State and be very capable
of performing his duties by a long distance telephone. He would be legally disabled from
doing so. Disability is more accurate." Transcript, Assembly Interim Comm. on Const.
Amends. 29-34 (Feb. 23, 1966) cited in In re Governorship, 26 Cal. 3d at 126, 603 P.2d at
1368, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
87. 26 Cal. 3d at 126, 603 P.2d at 1368, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
88. Id. at 127, 603 P.2d at 1368, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
89. Id. at 128, 603 P.2d at 1369, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
90. CAL. CONST. of 1849 art. V, § 17. See also note 40 supra.
91. CAL. CONST. of 1849 art. V, § 17.
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constitution was revised in 1879.92 A 1946 amendment provided that
"[iun case of impeachment of the Governor or officer acting as Gover-
nor, his absence from the State, or his other temporary disability to
discharge the powers and duties of office, then the powers and duties of
the Office of Governor devolve upon [the Lieutenant Governor].1 93
Justice Newman concluded that because "there is not even a scrap of
evidence that suggests any intent by anyone in 1946 to distinguish 'dis-
ability' from 'inability,' "94 the words having been treated as syno-
nomous since 1849, the special counsel to the Constitutional Revision
Commission erred when he attempted to make such a distinction
before the legislature in 1966.91 The purpose of the 1966 revision was
to provide a "scheme of succession" for the executive branch of state
government.96 The Constitutional Revision Commission refused to
spell out limitations or describe specific situations that would impose a
limitation on the body (ie., the California Supreme Court) that was
charged with deciding what is a temporary disability. According to
Justice Newman, however, the majority opinion here did set forth a
needless limitation-that mere absence is a disability, always.97 Thus,
"[iun 1979, as in 1849, absence should effect the transfer of gubernato-
rial power only when in fact it is disabling, temporarily." 98
C. Official Travel
Justice Newman's final point revealed further weakness in the ma-
jority's opinion.99 Most travels by a governor outside the state are for
official state purposes." If, according to the majority opinion, the
92. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. V, § 16. See note 40 supra. Section 16 was considerably
expanded, however, in the 1879 revision, providing an order of succession (down to seven
state officers) should the office of governor become vacant, or in the case of "death, disability
or other failure to take Office of both the Governor-elect and the Lieutenant Governor-
elect."
93. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. V, § 16 (amended 1946).
94. 26 Cal. 3d at 128, 603 P.2d at 1369, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 771 (emphasis omitted).
95. See note 86 and accompanying text supra. See also Presentation of ProposedArticle
V, Memorandum of the Constitutional Revision Commission, from the staff attorney to the
Chairman of the Commission, at 3 (April 7, 1966). (" '[T]emporary disability' has a suffi-
ciently definite and understood meaning to serve as a reasonable guideline for the court.
Additional detail might bind the court, .. in a way that defeats the otherwise clear purpose
underlying the scheme of succession. .. .") cited in In re Governorship, 26 Cal. 3d at 128,
603 P.2d at 1369, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 771-72.
96. 26 Cal. 3d at 128, 603 P.2d at 1369, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 771-72.
97. Id. at 129, 603 P.2d at 1370, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. It would appear that Governor Brown's travels outside California are an exception
to this rule. However, Gray Davis, Brown's executive secretary, who usually remains in
Sacramento during Brown's absences, has pointed out that he confers with Brown daily, no
matter where the Governor travels, and that critical decisions are still made by Brown. "I
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lieutenant governor has "the sole and entire power to act as Gover-
nor" 0 during the governor's absence, then 'may he not legally inter-
vene in the official projects of the traveling Governor?"'' 0 2 Justice
Newman gave several examples illustrating this point:
How should a Congressional committee respond if a telegram or
phone call from a Sacramento-based Lieutenant 'Governor pur-
ports to negate the on-going testimony of a Governor who is in
Washington, D.C., to describe California's emergency needs?
When the Governor is absent here but present there, who articu-
lates authoritatively our State's concerns at the out-of-State head-
quarters of the innumerable officials who, pursuant to
negotiations that might involve the Governor, supply federal
funds for State use? Who speaks and acts for California at Gov-
ernors' sessions, at formal meetings with other-State and overseas
investors, at innumerable other 'outside forums' where the Gov-
ernor's main concerns demonstrably are official concerns? 0 3
For Justice Newman, the majority opinion failed to address these ques-
tions. Indeed, he believed their conclusive dicta regarding the powers
of the lieutenant governor to act in the governor's absence might even
have a "yo-yo" effect if carried to its logical extreme, with a lieutenant
governor revoking an act of the governor which had rescinded a prior
act of the lieutenant governor. °4 For these reasons, Justice Newman
wanted to place a restriction on the powers of the lieutenant governor
to act during a governor's absence from the state.
IV. Analysis
Though the court in this case was faced with the lbroad issue of
determining the gubernatorial powers of the lieutenant governor dur-
ing the governor's absence from the state, their narrow holding, that the
lieutenant governor has authority to exercise all gubernatorial power of
appointment while the governor is absent, 05 has left many questions
unanswered-to wit: the authority of the lieutenant governor to exer-
cise the entire plethora of gubernatorial powers during a governor's ab-
sence.
never forget who the Governor is," Davis says. San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 13, 1980, at I,
col. 2.
I01. 26 Cal. 3d at 119, 603 P.2d at 1363, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
102. Id. at 129, 603 P.2d at 1370, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
103. Id. at 129-30, 603 P.2d at 1370, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
104. Id. at 130, 603 P.2d at 1370, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 773. Suppose, for example, Curb had
withdrawn the Jefferson appointment and reappointed Arabian during a subsequent absence
of the Governor.
105. Id. at 113, 603 P.2d at 1359, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 762. See note 5 and accompanying
text supra.
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A. The Majority Opinion
There seems little doubt that the court had proper jurisdiction to
determine questions arising in this dispute. 0 6 The Commission on the
Governorship properly petitioned the court for a determination of
questions arising under article V, section 10, and the court was free to
consider arguments from other interested parties; in this case, Brown
and Curb. In its petition, the Commission stated that the broader ques-
tion of the lieutenant governor's powers to act as governor during the
governor's absence "encompasses the entire spectrum of executive
power." 0 7 Given the practical impossibility of convening the Commis-
sion and the supreme court every time the governor leaves the state, the
Commission urged that guidelines be established for future clarifica-
tion of the lieutenant governor's powers on such occasions. The court's
unwillingness to issue such a guide, 108 coupled with its narrow holding,
indicates a reluctance to leap into the thicket of intragovernmental
branch disputes. Perhaps this was a political judgment, or perhaps it
was a sincere disinclination to issue a broadly sweeping set of rules,
opting instead to rely on case-by-case analysis. The court provides no
answers here.
The court's determination not to budge from a "Gold Rush Days"
interpretation of "absence from the state," 10 9 however, is disturbing.
They rely not only upon constitutional and legislative history, but on
historical practices and public policy arguments as well. The fact that a
word or a phrase has remained in the constitution for 130 years should
not make it immune from new judicial interpretations."10 The words of
God may remain unchanging through the ages, but it is arrogant to
assume that a state constitution will remain immortal and subject to
only one interpretation-that given it by its framers. In interpreting
the phrase "All men are created equal," would the court exclude wo-
men?
Reliance on the historical practices of a succession of California
governors is also misguided."' The court looks to the past sixteen
years and concludes that, since over 1,400 gubernatorial actions have
been taken by an acting governor without challenge while the governor
106. See CAL. CONST. art. V, § 10. See also notes 22-31 and accompanying text supra.
107. Petition for Determination of Questions under section 10 of Article V of the Califor-
nia Constitution by the Commission on the Governorship at 3, cited in In re Governorship,
26 Cal. 3d at 116, 603 P.2d at 1361, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
108. 26 Cal. 3d at 116, 603 P.2d at 1361, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
109. Id. at 125, 603 P.2d at 1367, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 769. See also note 81 and accompany-
ing text supra.
110. But see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977) for an opposing view.
I 11. See notes 43-46 and accompanying text supra.
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was physically absent," 2 the actions of Lieutenant Governor Curb
should be approved. The court fails to note, however, that in most of
these cases the governor and acting governor were of the same political
party. In the few situations where this was not the case, the governor
and acting governor usually reached agreement before the governor left
the state as to what actions the acting governor could take.' '3 Thus,
this dispute is before the court because of a unique set of circum-
stances-the two leaders of the executive branch of state government
are from different political parties and they are unwilling to cooperate
with each other. A unique situation requires more than reliance on
historical practices.
The court also invokes a public policy rationale for its interpreta-
tion. The Lieutenant Governor's position is supported by "the need for
certainty in effectuating executive decisions."' " 4 Yet, because of its
narrow holding, the only certainty about the Lieutenant Governor's po-
sition is that he may make a judicial appointment to an appellate court
during the Governor's absence, subject to the Governor's rescission
upon his return. The court concludes that the Lieutenant Governor is
free to act on matters he determines need attention during the Gover-
nor's absence, but they never state why the appointment in this particu-
lar case needed attention on March 27 at 3 p.m.' '5
The majority, relying on the Marbury" 16 principle, upheld Brown's
authority to withdraw Curb's appointment upon returning to the
state.1 '7 The appointment process in this case was not complete until
the Commission on Judicial Appointments confirmed the appointee.
As such, the Governor was free to withdraw the Arabian appointment
upon returning to the state. The court also relied upon the general rule
in other states that nominations can be changed at the will of the execu-
tive until title to office is vested in the appointee." i It is unclear why
the court was so quick to rely on the policies of other jurisdictions for
disposition of this issue when they were reluctant to examine other
courts' interpretations of "absence from the state."
112. 26 Cal. 3d at 118 n.6, 603 P.2d at 1363 n.6, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 763 n.6. See also note
45 and accompanying text supra.
113. In 1972, for example, Governor Reagan and Lieutenant Governor Reinecke at-
tended the Republican National Convention in Miami. The President pro tempore of the
Senate, James Mills, a Democrat, became Acting Governor for one week. He held an in-
auguration and prepared a state-of-the-State address, but had an agreement with Reagan to
take no significant actions. L. HARDY, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT 33 (4th ed. 1973).
114. 26 Cal. 3d at 117, 603 P.2d at 1362, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 765. See also note 39 and
accompanying text supra.
115. See notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra.
116. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See note 57 and accompanying
text supra.
117. See notes 54-69 and accompanying text supra.
118. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
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B. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Newman, in his concurrence, agreed that the withdrawal of
Judge Arabian's appointment was valid, but would have held that a
physically absent governor did have the power to exercise gubernato-
rial duties, despite his absence.' 19 His argument, simply stated, is that
an absence that is not actually physically disabling is not a temporary
disability. He based this argument on a somewhat weak foundation-
the true legislative intent in 1966 cannot be ascertained through the
legislative committee hearings because the answers given by staff coun-
sel were too misleading to form a reliable interpretation of legislative
intent.'20 The weakness of Justice Newman's argument rests on his
failure to indicate what the court should look to if it disregards legisla-
tive history. There remains little on which to base any reliable inter-
pretations of legislative intent. Unfortunately, he provides no
alternative methods.
But Justice Newman does have a stronger argument. A governor
often is required to be absent from the state on official business. If the
lieutenant governor is exercising the "sole and entire power" ' of the
absent governor, what powers does the traveling governor have when
conducting state business? The majority failed to answer this question.
It also neglected to address the detrimental effects that may result from
Justice Newman's "yo-yo" hypothesis.' 22 By skirting these issues, the
majority further pollutes an already muddy pond.
V. Alternative Solutions
A. Practices in Other States
Several states in addition to California have perceived a need for
some type of succession arrangement in the event of a governor's disa-
bility. Problems at the national level led to a passage of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.12 3 However, the
states generally have not followed this reform.
119. See notes 70-104 and accompanying text supra.
120. See notes 84-88 and accompanying text supra.
121. 26 Cal. 3d at 119, 603 P.2d at 1363, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
122. Id. at 130, 603 P.2d at 1370, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 773. See also note 104 and accompa-
nying text supra.
123. Section 3 provides that, "[/r7henever the President transmits to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representati% es his written declara-
tion that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, . . such powers and
duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President." (Emphasis added). It
also provides that the Vice President and a majority of cabinet officers can transmit to the
Senate or House a declaration that the President is unable to discharge his duties, where-
upon the Vice President immediately becomes Acting President. This amendment was ap-
proved by Congress in 1965 and ratified in 1967.
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Most states have constitutional provisions concerning succession to
the governorship, 124 yet only sixteen states have established a proce-
dure for determining gubernatorial disability. 25 The procedure in
124. The following states have constitutional provisions similar to California's article V,
section 10: ALA. CONsT. art. III, §§ 9-13; ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 6; ARK. CONST. art. VI,
amend. 6(4); COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 13; CONN. CONST. art. IV, § 18; HAWAII CONST. art. V,
§ 4; IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 12; ILL. CONsT. art. V, § 6; Ky. CONST. § 85; LA. CONsT. art.
IV, § 19; MASS. CONST. part II, ch. II, § III, art. 6, amend. LV; MICH. CONST. art. V, § 26;
MISS. CONST. art. V, § 131; Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 11; MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 14; NEB.
CONST. art. IV, § 16; NEv. CONsT. art. V, § 18; N.H. CONST. part II, art. 49; N.J. CONST. art.
V, § 1, para. 7; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 7; N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 5; N.C. CONST. art. III, § 12;
N.D. CONST. art. III, § 72; OR. CONST. art. V, § 8a; R.I. CONST. art. VII, § 9; S.D. CONST.
art. IV, § 6; TEx. CONST. art. IV, § 16; UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 11; WIS. CONST. art. V, § 7;
WYO. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
125. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR: THE OF-
FICE AND ITS POWERS I (1976). These states use a two-step process in which the request for
a finding of disablity, either mental or physical, is initiated by an official or an official body,
with the actual determination being made by a separate body. (See following table).
INITIATING
THE REQUEST
2 officers in line to succeed
Governor
Commission on the Gover-
norship
Joint resolution of legisla-
ture
4 cabinet members (or
Governor himself)
President pro tem. of Sen-
ate and Speaker of House
Chief Justice or first in
line to succeed Governor
Joint resolution of General
Assembly
President pro tem. of Sen-
ate and Speaker of House
First in line to succeed
Governor
Joint resolution of legisla-
ture
Chief Justice or first in










Governor himself or Chief
Justice and majority of
assoc. justicesb
Supreme Court
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these states is applicable to both the physical and mental disability of
the governor.12
6
B. Proposals for Reform
A solution to the types of issues raised by In re Governorshp was
proposed by Ira H. Lurvey, I2 7 in an article stemming from the Nevada
Supreme Court's decision in Sawyer v. First Judicial District Court.2 '
There, the Governor was absent from the state for approximately five
hours. During that time, the Lieutenant Governor ordered the em-
panelment of a grand jury. The court determined that the Lieutenant
Governor had no power to request the empanelment, and the Governor
had properly revoked the request upon his return.129
Supporting the Sawyer decision, Lurvey suggested that the prob-
lem in such cases was the conflict arising between a territorial limita-
tion on the powers of office and an abhorrence of government by
absentee officials on one hand, and the citizens' right to be governed by
the policies of the individual they elected to office on the other. 30 The
INITIATING DETERMINING
STATE THE REQUEST THE DISABILITY
South Carolina Majority of executive
department heads
Virginia Majority of executive
department heads or
majority of legislature
a) Members include the Chief Justice, the Director of Mental Health, and the Dean of Medicine
at Iowa State University.
b) Such a declaration results in a vacancy of the office of governor.
c) Members include the Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, State Auditor, State Treasurer,
Attorney General, President pro tempore of the Senate, Speaker of the House, and Senate and
House Majority Leaders. If the Governor disagrees with this determination, the Board can submit
the issue to the Missouri Supreme Court.
d) Members include the Director of the Nebraska, PsychiatriclInstitute, Dean of the University
of Nebraska College of Medicine and dean of a second accredited state college of medicine.
e) Members include the Chief Justice, Superintendent of the State Hospital and Dean of the
University of Oregon Medical School.
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra at 11-15.
126. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 125, at 11-15. However, in
Alabama and North Carolina, it is applicable only in cases of mental disability.
127. Lurvey, Absent Officials: No Carte Blanchefor Successors, 15 J. PUB. L. 324 (1966).
See also note 36 and accompanying text supra.
128. 82 Nev. 53, 410 P.2d 748 (1966).
129. 82 Nev. at 58, 410 P.2d at 751. "The overwhelming majority of states which have
examined identical or nearly identical provisions [of the state constitution] have found that
'absence' as contained within rules for orderly succession in government means 'effective
absence'--e., an absence which is measured by the state's need at a given moment for a
particular act by the official then physically not present." 82 Nev. at 56, 410 P.2d at 749
(emphasis omitted).
130. Lurvey, supra note 127 at 326.
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solution to this conflict, according to Lurvey, lies in a simplified test:
when an official is not present, his successor automatically assumes full,
but latent powers, to be activated only to the extent that a particular act
is reasonably necessary at that moment.13 This proposal has failed to
win acceptance by any court faced with the issue of gubernatorial suc-
cession since 1966.
Probably the most logical approach to solving future succession
disputes is the team election of the governor and lieutenant gover-
nor, 1 32 similar to the national practice of a two-man presidential ticket.
This would have the advantage of avoiding party splits. The concept
was initiated by New York in 1953, and has since spread to over one-
third of the states.' 33
A more radical approach was proposed last fall by California State
Assemblyman Gary Hart. 34 His constitutional amendment, as origi-
nally proposed, would have completely abolished the office of lieuten-
ant governor, effective when the present incumbent leaves it. It has
since been amended however, to leave the office intact, but to strip the
lieutenant governor of any gubernatorial power while the governor is
absent from the state. 35
C. A Suggested Approach
Few would disagree that the state must be governed at all times.
The sheer size of the government requires as much. It is also an ac-
cepted fact that the governor is elected to govern the state.' 36 There are
times however, when the governor is unable to govern the state; at the
same time, emergency situations may arise requiring immediate actions
from the executive branch of government.137 The Constitution and leg-
islature have provided, first, that the lieutenant governor must fill the
governor's office should the governor be killed, missing or disabled, un-
13 I. Id. at 346-48.
132. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 125, at 4.
133. Id.
134. Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 13, 1979-80 Regular Session, California
Legislature.
135. The bill succeeded in passing the Assembly Committee on Government and Organ-
ization, but later died on the floor of the Assembly.
136. At least accepted by most-a commentator recently paraphrased an old saying, by
remarking that Earl Warren proved that a person could be Governor of California forever,
Pat Brown proved that anybody could be Governor, and Jerry Brown is proving that Cali-
fornia does not need a governor. San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 7, 1980, at 27, col. I.
137. Justice Newman indicates, in his concurrence, that a war- or enemy-caused disaster
may require immediate action on the part of the executive. See notes 79-80 and accompany-
ing text supra. Such emergency situations are by no means limited to these causes. Other
situations requiring an executive's immediate attention could include inter alia, natural di-
sasters; street, prison, or other types of riots; major disturbances; or the stayings of capital
punishment sentences.
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til the governor is able to perform his duties again, 38 and second, that
the lieutenant governor acts as governor during the impeachment, ab-
sence from the state, or other temporary disability of the governor.
39
It should follow from these premises that absence from the state
constitutes a "disability," like other temporary disabilities, only when it
is in fact disabling-that is, when the governor is unable to act in an
emergency situation that requires his immediate attention. 40 As long
as the governor is capable of performing his executive duties, regardless
of his physical location, the lieutenant governor need not assume the
duties of the governor's office.
If the governor's absence is not in fact disabling, the lieutenant
governor should not act because the duties of the governor's office are
still possessed by the governor. In short, although article V, section 10
of the California Constitution ostensibly confers full gubernatorial
power on the lieutenant governor during the governor's absence from
the state, a more sensible interpretation is that the section actually con-
fers only as much power as is necessary to govern the state while the
governor is in fact disabled, and only for as long as the governor's disa-
bility continues. This approach would not only promote intragovern-
mental harmony, but would provide a workable and practical solution
to the future problems that are bound to surface in spite of, or perhaps
because of, the California Supreme Court's decision in In re Governor-
shi.
Conclusion
Although article V, section 10 of the California Constitution seems
clear on its face, and has been relatively free of controversy since its
adoption in 1966, the conflict in In re Governorshp,'a' has given rise to
many significant and provocative issues for adjudication.
Undoubtedly, the decision reached in this case as to the guberna-
torial powers of the lieutenant governor during the governor's absence
from the state was within the realm of proper judicial interpretation.
However, for the reasons previously alluded to, the majority opinion is
lacking in the depth of analysis necessary to support any persuasive
conclusions. A definite set of guidelines is necessary to preserve the
effectiveness of the executive branch of the state government. Indeed,
138. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 21(b); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12058.5 (Deering, 1973).
139. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 10.
140. See notes 73-77 and accompanying text supra. One could argue under this analysis
that all non-emergency actions of past acting governors are invalid. However, in almost all
situations, actions taken by the acting governor were with the direct or implied consent of
the governor, were taken pursuant to an agreement with the governor (see e.g., note 113
supra); or were of so little consequence as to preclude any major disputes.
141. 26 Cal. 3d 110, 603 P.2d 1357, 160 Cal. Rptr. 760.
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the court's refusal to deal with the subject, and its rather cavalier treat-
ment of the arguments presented, assure that the issues in dispute here
will be raised again.
As a brief postscript, during the months pending the outcome of In
re Governorshp, relations between the Governor and Lieutenant Gov-
ernor were anything but harmonious.142 They are no better now.
Brown has continued to leave the state without hesitation. While the
Governor did agree to appoint a small number of those recommended
by Curb to various state posts, Brown has refused all of Curb's recom-
mendations to the bench. 43 The standoff remains-exacerbated, per-
haps, by the California Supreme Court's decision in In re Governorsho.
142. See note I I supra.
143. San Francisco Chronicle, January 11, 1980 at 7, col. 1. However, Curb said that he
intended to get his fair share of judicial appointments, either by cooperating with Brown or
acting when he leaves the state. "If he's out of the state a third of the time, I'd like to have a
third of the responsibility, and that means a third of the input and a third of anything else
that goes along with maintaining that responsibility." Id.
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